The Royals came into the 2005-2006 offseason with an interesting set of options before them. They had $22 million to spend on free agents, which would lead one to think that good things can occur for the first time in awhile in Kansas City. This is not the case, as the current free agent class contained only a handful of very talented players, and none of these players were about to sign with a franchise that has been, to put it kindly, an embarrassment as of late, excepting their 2003 season where they surprised a great deal of people. This year’s free agent class was weak, to put it kindly, and none of the top-tier free agents would be particularly interested in signing with a team as downtrodden as the Royals have been. A second route was to invest the money into the minor leagues, future draft picks and the player development system. After having negotiating issues with 2005 first round pick (and #2 overall) Alex Gordon over money, $22 million in hand to help draft the first overall choice in 2006 would make sense. The Royals could also draft Scott Boras clients that fall to later rounds or spots due to cash issues like the larger market teams do (along the lines of Boston and Los Angeles in the 2005 draft, with Craig Hansen and Luke Hochevar respectively). The Royals will most likely have a top five pick in 2007 as well, which only makes it more appealing. They could use it to lock up the young talent they do have to long-term, inexpensive contracts through the arbitration years; players like Zach Greinke, Billy Butler, Alex Gordon or Justin Huber form an excellent talent base, especially if they are going to stick around at a discount price for the Royals. Instead the Royals chose to spend their $22 million on middle tier free agents in order to attempt to win 75 games in 2006. Basically, they are trying to upgrade themselves from awful to poor.

This strategy has a few perks, although none of them are actually significant. The majority of the deals are one and two year contracts, meaning the players will be off of the books after 2008; essentially the time KC expects the top prospects they do have to be ready for the majors. They would then have money available to sign useful free agents or lock up some of the young talent currently on their roster as previously mentioned. This move is also a plea to fans to start attending games again; a hopeful plea stating that things are going to start changing in Kansas City, effective immediately. I am not positive that the fans are going to buy into that this time around, as they have been jerked around by plans before. An interesting take on the whole situation: if the Royals do improve 10-15 games somehow, they will lose their valuable spot in the draft order, since it is determined by record. Considering they are not quite there yet talent wise, this spot would be useful to keep around as long as the Royals can hold it, even if that sounds counterproductive.

The Royals did end up involving themselves in a great deal of transactions this winter. They signed three possible starters, traded for another, signed a new first basemen, a new right fielder, a new second basemen, and a new backup catcher, as well as acquiring a new utility infielder. That is a great deal of roster turnover, but that does not necessarily mean the results will be worth all of the dealing. Let’s take a look at this position by position:

The above table details some important numbers from the five pitchers with over 100 innings pitched for Kansas City in 2005. IP is obviously innings pitched; VORP is Value Over Replacement Pitcher, a Baseball Prospectus statistic useful for measuring value easily in a situation such as this one. PRAA is Pitching Runs Above Average, which amazingly enough, these pitchers did not collect a single one of. PRAA measures exactly what it says; pitching run value above the average pitcher. BABIP is Batting Average on Balls in Play, which helps you recognize luck, whether it be good or bad, and the role the defense played in a pitcher’s success. For example, Zach Greinke’s .340 BABIP is somewhere around the range of 30-40 points above league average, which can be blamed on two things. First, his defense was awful, and second, Greinke threw that batting practice-esque “fast” ball a few times too many in 2005, which caused him to be extremely hittable on occasion. Back on track we go…the Royals were awful in the rotation in 2005, but Mike Wood shows promise, Greinke is still very young, and Carrasco was nifty surprise, although I would not want him as the second most valuable starter on the team. Jettisoning Lima gives this team a much better rotation, even if they did not bother to replace him at all.

Let’s look at the arms that the Royals brought in to replace parts of the 2005 rotation in order to see whether or not they improved themselves at all:

The reason I chose to use PRAA as well as VORP was to show you how pointless these signings actually are. To be fair, Dessens is most likely going to end up in the bullpen, especially if Jeremy Affeldt moves to the rotation in 2006, but the other three pitchers are all below average. Scott Elarton was helped out a great deal by his BABIP, which can be attributed to an Indians’ defense that ranked third in defensive efficiency; the Royals ranked dead last overall. Which basically means, watch out for Elarton to regress, possibly even in a way that resembles Brian Anderson in his poorer Royals moments. Mark Redman, who will receive $4.5 million in 2006, will most likely pitch less effectively as well thanks to the defensive problems, as well as the fact that he is switching back to the American League. Joe Mays is only making one million dollars in 2006, but with the possibility that he will receive another million in incentives for games started and innings around, the Royals might be able to waste twice as much. Mays is not as poor a pitcher as Lima was in 2005, but he certainly is not that much of an improvement. The argument for signing these pitchers, besides name recognition, is that they can eat innings and pitch well enough to earn their paycheck. Here is the problem I see with this theory:

The theoretical rotation is $7,865,000 cheaper, and since the players on the left would be on the roster anyways, the grand total is closer to $10 million. With the difference in expected performance not large enough to make a difference in either direction, and the idea that one of the younger pitchers might actually surprise the Royals (like Mike Wood or Denny Bautista turning into a decent starter, or Jeremy Affeldt finally putting it all together) is more valuable than the thought of letting a veteran lose games just as often at a higher cost to the team. Until the young players develop and better decisions are made my the front office in terms of promotions and acquisitions, the Royals should not spend any additional money on the rotation, at least not in the form of veteran talent that they really do not have a place for to begin with.